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Despite the failure of the U.N. Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009 efforts are 
continuing to reach agreement on binding global commitments on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. At the same time, efforts are still underway to conclude the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations through the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both of these agreements could 
have a significant impact on the level of activity in agriculture and the GHG emissions that it 
generates. In this paper we explore strategies to comply with both trade liberalization and 
GHG emission reduction commitments. We examine the implications of trade liberalization 
and a carbon tax, both of which affect agricultural output, as means of achieving emission 
reductions.  We  emphasize  two  diametrically  different  responses  to  a  carbon  tax.  One 
adaptation is to change the way agricultural commodities are produced, i.e., choosing less 
polluting techniques, which we argue will require more land per unit of output. The second 
response  is  to  use  agricultural  land  for  carbon  sequestration  purposes  (offsets),  e.g.,  for 
perennial grasses or forestry. We show that when an offset option is introduced, production 
intensity tends to increase, such that emissions per unit of output rise. The theoretical results 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the failure of the U.N. Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009 efforts are 
continuing to reach agreement on binding global commitments on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.  Although  agriculture  has  been  exempted  so  far  from  most  national  carbon 
reduction initiatives, it is likely that the sector will be included in future GHG tax or quota 
systems. At the same time, efforts are still underway to conclude the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations through the World Trade Organization (WTO). Potential future climate and trade 
agreements  will  affect  the  relative  profitability  of  different  farming  systems,  the  level  of 
agricultural activity, and GHG emissions generated by the sector.          
  In this paper we explore viable strategies for complying with both trade liberalization 
and GHG emission reduction commitments. Our analysis takes the perspective of a small 
country  whose  agriculture  is  currently  protected  and  whose  political  aim  is  to  keep 
agricultural  activity  as  high  as  possible  within  the  constraints  imposed  by  multinational 
agreements. We examine the implications of trade liberalization and a carbon tax, both of 
which affect agricultural output, as means of achieving emission reductions. We emphasize 
two diametrically different responses to a carbon tax. One adaptation is to change the way 
agricultural  commodities  are produced,  i.e.,  choosing  less polluting  techniques,  which  we 
argue will require more land per unit of output (referred to as lower production intensity). The 
second response is to use agricultural land for carbon sequestration purposes (offsets), e.g., for 
perennial grasses or forestry. We show that when an offset option is introduced, production 
intensity tends to increase, such that emissions per produced unit of output rise.        
  Our paper is divided into two parts. In the first part we use a simple analytical model 
to demonstrate the main mechanisms through which trade liberalization and climate change 
policies affect output and emissions. Second, we use a comprehensive partial equilibrium 
model  of  the  Norwegian  agricultural  sector  (Jordmod)  to  examine  the  consequences  for 
Norwegian agriculture.  
  In the analytical model we use the simplifying assumption that the agricultural sector 
receives  support  solely  in  the  form  of  output  subsidies.  We  examine  the  effects  of  trade 
liberalization by decreasing these subsidies, which, consequently, lowers farm gate prices. 
Since factor prices are unchanged in this case, there is no change in the way production takes 
place. The impact on emissions is felt through a scale effect, i.e., production declines and so 
do GHG emissions. The trade liberalization results are then compared to a case in which an 
equivalent carbon emission reduction is achieved through a carbon tax. Using a carbon tax,   3
we expect a shift towards less polluting agricultural techniques. This can indeed happen, but if 
carbon offsets are possible we demonstrate that the opposite may actually occur. The reason is 
that when offsets are an option, land that remains in agricultural production is implicitly taxed 
(land diverted to offsets is rewarded). Farmers then have an incentive to intensify production 
on remaining land by using productivity enhancing inputs, even if these cause pollution, to 
release land for offset activities. We call this phenomenon perverse intensity reversal.  
  Regardless of whether perverse intensity reversal applies, agricultural production will 
be larger with the carbon tax compared to the trade liberalization case. We also show that if 
the  sector  has  a  wide  range  of  possibilities  for  choosing  between  more  or  less  polluting 
techniques (the substitution elasticity is high), we may end up in a situation where production 
is higher compared to the base case.     
  In the final section of the paper we assess the consequences for Norwegian agriculture. 
We  use  a  partial  equilibrium  model  of  the  Norwegian  agricultural  sector  (Jordmod)  that 
includes  demand  and  supply  relations  and  the  most  important  commodities,  regions, 
technologies and policy instruments. Coefficients for GHG emission and sequestration are 
attached  to  activities  and  production  factors  in  the  model.  The  point  of  departure  is  the 
model’s representation of current policy (base solution), which is characterized by prohibitive 
tariffs and large subsidies that make it possible to maintain a high degree of self sufficiency in 
spite of climatic disadvantages. GHG emissions from agriculture constitute an estimated 8 per 
cent of the Norwegian total although the sector accounts for only 1 percent of GDP. A major 
part  of  these  emissions  is  associated  with  ruminant  animals  (which  are  important  in 
Norwegian  agriculture)  and  high  intensity  in  the  use  of  fertilizer  (to  compensate  for 
climatically related low yields).       
  In the run up to the Copenhagen climate conference, Norway proposed a 30 percent 
reduction in economy wide GHG emissions by 2020 (compared to the 1990 level). In the 
analysis we assume that agriculture has to reduce its emissions by this percentage in the 2003 
base year used in the model.
1 For the trade liberalization scenario we use the latest proposal 
for support reduction commitments prepared by the previous chair of the WTO agricultural 
committee, Crawford Falconer (WTO, 2008)   
  The  trade  liberalization  proposals  in  the  Doha  round  are  characterized  by  weak 
disciplines with respect to the use of trade distorting support. Consequently, our results show 
that they would not produce a sufficiently large cut in either agricultural production or GHG 
                                                 
1 Norway’s GHG emissions in 2003 were below the level in 1990, so this overstates the actual reduction that 
would be required (Statistics Norway, 2011).   4
emissions.  To  achieve  the  assumed  30 per  cent  cut, more  effective  trade  liberalization  is 
required, whose effects can then be compared to a more targeted abatement policy involving a 
tax on GHG emissions.  
  While the decrease in GHG emissions is mainly due to lower production under trade 
liberalization, the imposition of a carbon tax generates a change in production intensity (e.g., 
the use of fertilizer; tilled versus no till cropping). When carbon offsets are not an option for 
farmers, production intensity decreases (the output/land ratio falls), while the opposite applies 
when there is a high offset parameter. In Norway’s case, and indeed from a wider perspective, 
these  results  raise  questions  about  consistency  and  trades off  in  climate  policy  between 
production  intensive  farming  (high  GHG  emissions  from  land  used  for  farming  with  the 
diversion of remaining land to carbon sequestration activities) and land intensive farming 
(low  GHG  emissions  from  a  land extensive  agricultural  production  system  without  the 
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2. The basic problem 
We consider a small country facing given world market prices. Agriculture can either be 
protected by tariffs (e.g., Norway), or have a liberal trade regime (e.g., New Zealand). In both 
cases we assume that a target has been established for the CO2 equivalent of GHG emissions 
that  the  agricultural  sector  has  to  meet,  either  as  a  result  of  a  national  policy  to  reduce 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  or  as  part  of  an  international  agreement.  We  examine  two 
alternative  instruments  to  achieve  this  target:  a  reduction  in  the  prices  of  agricultural 
commodities or the use of a carbon tax. Price reduction can be achieved through cuts in tariffs 
(Norway), or by imposing a tax on agricultural commodities (New Zealand). In the case of a 
carbon tax we assume that this is levied on inputs that generate pollution (e.g., inorganic 
fertilizer). 
 
2.1 The technical structure for production and emissions  
The agricultural sector produces commodities by using land and other inputs, summarized by 
the production function:  
 
(1)  , L K ) L , K ( Y Y
β α = =   1 < + β α . 
  
Y is (aggregate) production, L is land used in farming and K is other inputs, hereafter referred 
to as capital. Note that we assume that production exhibits decreasing return to scale. 
While L is land used in farming, we can think of K as production factors that are used 
to generate agricultural output from the land, e.g., fertilizer and machinery used for tillage. 
The assumed Cobb Douglas technology says that it is possible to substitute between L and K. 
In our case this means that land can replace fertilizer and tilling (and vice versa).
2  
The sector’s emission of GHG, E, is specified through the functional relationship: 
 
(2) 
τ ζ − ρ = = Y L K ) Y , L , K ( E E , 
 
i.e. emissions are assumed to be dependent on the use of capital, farm land, and the size of 
production. Our motivation for (2) is as follows: In practice, the level of emissions depends on 
chosen production techniques. A technique that requires the use of pesticides pollutes more 
                                                 
2  The  substitution  possibilities  are  given  by  the  elasticity  of  substitution.  Since  we  have  a  Cobb Douglas 
production technology this elasticity is unity.    
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than a technique that is free from pesticides. Since pesticides are part of K, the higher the use 
of K, ceteris paribus (given L and Y), the higher GHG emissions. The parameter ρ measures 
the strength of this effect. Use of land may have the opposite effect. For example, the use of 
synthetic fertilizers in grain production improves productivity, but also increases emissions. 
By substituting fertilizer for land grain production, emissions will be lower while keeping 
grain production unchanged. Consequently, with K and Y constant, an increase in L yields a 
decrease in E. The parameter ς measures the size of this effect. Lastly, the activity level of the 
sector matters. This level is measured by the aggregate production, and the emission effect by 
τ.  The  relationship  (2)  suppresses  many  relevant  factors  and  is  exceedingly  simple. 
Nevertheless, it reflects basic factors that are relevant for the discussion of GHG emissions. In 
the following we strengthen this focus by further simplifying (2) to: 
 
(3)  Y )
L
K
( ) Y , L , K ( E E
ρ = = , 
 
i.e. assuming ρ= ς and τ=1. In the later discussion ρ will be referred to as the coefficient 
representing the intensity of emissions. To sum up: if more land is used in farming, Y will 
increase. For this reason, pollution will also increase. We will refer to this as the production 
effect. On the other hand, (holding K constant), production becomes less capital intensive. 
This means that pollution will decrease. This will be referred to as the intensity effect.  
In addition to use land in farming (L), land can be devoted to carbon sequestration 
activities  (offsets),  for  example  the  planting  of  perennial  grasses  or  trees.  Formally,  our 
assumption is: 
 
) L L ( − λ , 
 
where λ is the sequestration coefficient per hectare.  L  is the available land and ( L L − ) is 
land used for sequestration activities.
3 Taking this into account, (3) changes to:  
 
(4)  ) L L ( L K )
L
K
( ) ; L , K ( E E − − = = λ λ
β α ρ . 
 
                                                 
3 Land can simply be left idle and that may generate some carbon sequestration. That possibility is ignored and 
we assume that active sequestration uses for the land are required.    7
2.2 The efficiency problem 
Let us first define the profit, π, of the agricultural sector:  
 
(5)  ) L L ( q wL rK Y ) s p ( − + − − + = π , 
 
Here,  p  is the fixed world market price for farm output and s is the output subsidy (Norway). 
In addition, r and w are the user prices for capital and farm land respectively, and Y is given 
by (1). Furthermore, q is the per unit net profit from sequestration activities. 
There is a restriction on available land: 
 
(6)  L L ≤ . 
 
In our analysis, we assume that there is an agreement that CO2 emissions shall not 
exceed a certain level denoted by E , i.e. 
 
(7)  E E ≤ , 
 
where E is given by (4). If we look at current emission agreements, sequestration activities are 
not credited against the emissions generated by agricultural production; λ has therefore to be 
set to zero. The efficiency problem can now be stated as: 
 
Maximize π in (5), subject to (1), (4), (6) (7).  
 
This problem does not have  a unique solution. So, we solve the problem by either decreasing 
producer prices, p+s, or increasing input prices.  
 
2.3 Solving the efficiency problem 
In Figure 1, we illustrate the solution when there is no emission constraint, i.e. (7) is not taken 
into account. The optimal solution, called the base solution, is marked as point 1. From Figure 
1 we can read the optimal quantities of K and L, and the optimal output as Y1 associated with 
the isoquant Y1 Y1. Note that we have assumed that in the optimal solution all available land is 
used for farming.  
   8
 
   
Figure 1: The base solution 
 
We take it for  granted  that at point 1, emissions exceed the target  . E  Next we take the 
emission constraint (7) into account. Assume first that we solve the problem by liberalizing 
trade, for example by reducing import tariffs. This means reducing producer prices. Since the 
production function is homothetic, and since relative input prices (w+q)/r are kept constant, 
we move down the straight line ray through the origin in Figure 1. We continue the decrease 
in import tariffs until we have reached the emission target,  E , illustrated as point 2 in Figure 





         
1  
Slope: (w+q)/r  K
L  9
 
Figure 2: Achieving the emission target through trade liberalization or a carbon tax when the 
sequestration effect (λ) is weak or zero 
 
The emission constraint    
In  Figure  2,  we  have  also  represented  the  emission  constraint  by  the  indifference  curve, 
E E − . This is derived from (4), setting  E E = :  
 
(8)  ) L L ( L K )
L
K
( E − − = λ
β α ρ , 
 
which is a relationship in K and L. The sign of the slope of the  E E − curve can be derived by 











         
1  
 2  








































β − α −
ρ −
1  10
We  see  that  ( ) dL
dK <0  if  β>ρ,  i.e.  the  distribution  parameter  for  land  is  larger  than  the 
intensity coefficient. The sequestration parameter λ simply determines the steepness of the 
E E −  curve. In the extreme case of λ=0, we see that the  curve is less steep than the Y2 Y2 
curve
4, which is the case drawn into Figure 2. The same holds for small values of λ. Consider 
the point marked as 4. Here all land is used for agricultural production and the amount of 
capital used, K , generates emissions equal to E .  
  For larger values of λ, the  E E −  curve becomes steeper than the Y2 Y2 curve, as 
shown in Figure 3. The emission curve,  E E − , still goes through the “non sequestration” 
point 4. Trade liberalization now gives a solution at point 5. We see that production now is at 
a higher level compared to the zero (or low) λ case, i.e. point 2.    
 
Using a carbon tax to achieve the emission target 
(i)  Weak offsets (λ low or zero) 
An alternative way to reduce pollution is through taxing inputs. In the case depicted in Figure 
2 this means taxing capital. Relative factor prices will then change to the benefit of those 
generating lower emissions, so that the target on emissions can be met at lower costs through 




(ii)  Strong offsets (λ high)  
When λ is high, the  E E −  curve is steeper than the isoquant. From Figure 3, we see that in 
this case the optimal point is to the north west of point 5, marked as point 6. To reach this 
point land must be taxed. Consequently, for high λs factor intensity is reversed compared to 
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5 Production in point 3 will be lower than that in point 1. The reason is that, compared to point 1, ceteris paribus, 


















Figure 3: Achieving the emission target through trade liberalization or a carbon tax when 
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3. The empirical model of Norwegian agriculture and the  
representation of GHG emissions  
The tool that we use to examine empirically the issues set out in the previous section is a 
partial equilibrium model for the Norwegian  agricultural sector: Jordmod. The model has 
been used earlier to analyse the provision of public goods by Norwegian agriculture (Brunstad 
et al. 1999 and 2005) and the effect of trade liberalization on the Norwegian agricultural 
sector (Blandford et al. 2010). A technical description of the model is given in Brunstad et al. 
(1995) and the latest version of the model is documented in Mittenzwei and Gaasland (2008). In 
the  following  we  provide  a  brief  overview  of  the  model,  with  special  emphasis  on  the 
treatment of GHG emissions. 
  Jordmod  is  a  price endogenous,  partial  equilibrium  model  of  the  type  described  in 
McCarl  and  Spreen  (1980).  For  given  technology  and  demand  functions,  domestic  market 
clearing prices and quantities are computed.  Prices of goods produced outside the agricultural 
sector or abroad are taken as given, and domestic and imported products are assumed to be 
perfect  substitutes.  As  the  model  assumes  full  mobility  of  labour  and  capital,  it  should  be 
interpreted as a long run model.  
  Domestic  production  takes  place  on  “model  farms”  with  fixed  input  and  output 
coefficients.
6 The model farms span 11 representative farm types (e.g., combined milk and 
beef; grains), distributed over 32 production regions (with varying yields and limited supply of 
different grades of land),  supplying  22  outputs  (e.g.,  wheat; potatoes;  cow  milk;  eggs) by 
means of 12 intermediate products (e.g., different grades of concentrated feed and roughage) 
and 25 other production factors (e.g., land, capital; labour, seeds; pesticides)
7. The produce 
from the model farms go through processing plants before being offered on the market.     
                                                 
6 Although, inputs cannot substitute for each other at the farm level, due to the fixed coefficient assumption, 
there  are  substitution  possibilities  at  the  sector  level.  For  example,  beef  can  be  produced  using  different 
technologies (model farms), both extensive and intensive production systems, and in combination with milk. 
Thus, in line with the general Leontief model in which more than one activity can be used to produce each good, 
the isoquant for each product is piecewise linear. Also, production can take place on small farms or larger more 
productive farms. Consequently, there is an element of economies of scale in the model.  
7 The model farms are optimized (in a separate module) for given prices, subsidy and tax rates, subject to 
functions for production technology (e.g., output and input coefficients per ha or per animal), and biological or 
natural restrictions. To increase the scope for substitution, model farms are constructed for different sets of 
relative prices (depending on specific scenarios). The data are based on extensive farm surveys carried out by the 
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute.  
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Functions and coefficients have been attached to activities and production factors in 
the model to reflect GHG emissions, based on the Intergovernmental Panel Climate Change 
(IPCC)  methodology,  adapted  to  Norwegian  conditions  and  practices.  Details,  including 
parameters, data sources and implementation, are given in Gaasland and Glomsrød (2010), 
but a short overview is presented below.  
 
Table 1. Sources of GHG emissions in Norwegian agriculture in CO2 equivalent, mill. kg. and 
percentage of total (2005)  
   
 
Enteric fermentation   1,917 (35%) 
Manure management   1,108 (20%) 
Fertilizer, manure     233 (4%) 
Fertilizer, syntetic      576 (11%) 
Net emmision land use     1,530 (28%) 
Other         69    (2%) 
Total GHG emissions     5,433 (100%) 
 
  The sources and the actual numbers of GHG emissions from Norwegian agriculture 
are given in Table 1. These are incorporated into the model. For milk cows, emissions from 
enteric fermentation are expressed as a function of the amount and mixture of feed, while for 
all other animals they are reflected by an animal specific constant parameter per head. The 
amount of manure, which leads to emissions of methane and nitrous oxide through manure 
management, and nitrous oxide generated by the use of manure as fertilizer, is modelled as a 
function of fodder intake for milk cows and as an animal specific constant for other animals. 
For  manure  management,  the  animal specific  emission  parameters  depend  on  the  system 
applied.  Constant  parameters  per  hectare,  which  differ  between  the  use  of  manure  and 
synthetic fertilizer, represent emissions of nitrous oxide from organic and inorganic fertilizers. 
Net emissions from land use relate to carbon dioxide that is assumed to be released from tilled 
land (2,000 kg per hectare per year) adjusted for the small amount assumed to be sequestered 
on no till land (about 100 kg per hectare per year). The ‘other’ category in Table 1 includes 
indirect  emissions  related  to  deposition  of  ammonia  and  leaching  and  runoff  of  nitrogen. 
Carbon dioxide released by the use of fossil fuel in agricultural activity (which amounts to 8 
per cent of the agricultural emissions) is not included in the model. Emissions of all GHG 
types are translated into carbon dioxide equivalents. 
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4. Model analysis  
As indicated above our analysis takes the perspective of a small country whose agriculture is 
currently protected and whose political aim is to keep agricultural activity as high as possible 
within the constraints imposed by multilateral agreements. The point of departure is existing 
policy, as generated by the model for the base year 2003. With respect to a potential new 
WTO trade agreement, we employ the Falconer proposal of December 2008 (WTO, 2008). 
No  similar  global  climate  policy  proposal  or  commitment  exists.  However,  prior  to  the 
Copenhagen climate conference, Norway proposed a reduction in economy wide emissions of 
30 per cent by 2020 (compared to the 1990 level). In our analysis we assume that agriculture 
has to reduce its GHG emissions by that percentage.  
4.1 Current situation  
The model’s representation of agricultural policy in the base year 2003 is reported in column 
1 of Table 2. Since the production of agricultural commodities, as well as agricultural support, 
has been relatively stable over the last decade, the base year 2003 is representative of the 
Norwegian support regime. In what follows, we emphasize current status with respect to trade 
liberalization and GHG emissions.   
  Norwegian agriculture, which accounts for less than one per cent of GDP and three per 
cent  of  domestic  employment,  is  among  the  most  heavily  protected  in  the  world  (NILF, 
2007).
8 As noted earlier, the OECD’s Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for Norway was 66 
per cent in 2009, the highest among the Organization’s member countries (OECD, 2010). The 
total agricultural support generated by the model is NOK 20.1 billion (1 NOK ≈ 0.125 €), of 
which NOK 11.8 billion is various forms of budget support and NOK 8.6 billion is market price 
support buttressed by import tariffs for major products in the range of 190 430 per cent.
9 Market 
price support and output subsidies constitute 60 per cent of the total support. (These numbers are 
not reported in Table 2). 
The first column in Table 2 shows that Norway exceeds the proposed Doha commitment 
on  the  Total  Aggregate  Measurement  of  Support  (TAMS)  by  102  per  cent,  Blue  Box 
commitment by 111 per cent and the Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS) by 95 per cent. 
                                                 
8 In spite of climatic disadvantage, Norway is self sufficient in the main temperate zone products, with the exception 
of grain. 10 per cent of the milk production is exported in the form of cheese, by means of export subsidies. 
9 By comparison, the actual producer subsidy estimate (PSE) reported by OECD for 2003 is NOK 21.7 billion, of 
which NOK 12.5 billion is budget support and NOK 9.2 billion is market price support.      15
Consequently, Norway is far from free trade in agriculture, and the sector would apparently be 
severely affected by extensive trade liberalization.  
As noted earlier, even through agriculture accounts for a small share of Norway’s GDP, it 
contributes  a significant share of the country’s total GHG emissions. Table 1 shows how these 
emissions are distributed across various sources. Enteric fermentation accounts for more than 1/3 
of total agricultural emissions. This source is closely related to the number of ruminants (i.e., 
dairy cows, heifers, beef cows, sheep and goats), which are the basis of most agricultural activity 
in Norway’s rural areas. Net emissions from agricultural land are the second largest category. 
Intensive soil tilling contributes to high emissions from agricultural land. Almost 90 per cent of 
the land is regularly tilled, i.e., land with permanent cover is scarce. 20 per cent of the emissions 
come from manure management, which is also correlated with the number of animals, inclusive 
of pigs, poultry and hens. Roughly 15 per cent of total emissions are associated with the use of 
fertilizer  (organic  and  inorganic).  Intensive  soil  tilling  and  use  of  fertilizer  are  a  ways  to 
compensate  for  climatically induced  low  yields  and  a  short  growing  season.  GHG  taxes  or 
regulations have so far not been imposed on Norwegian agriculture.    
 
Table 2. Trade liberalization versus a carbon tax –  results of model simulations 
 
   Base 





Carbon tax   
         No offset  Offset   No offset  Offset 
Production (index; base solution = 100)    100  96  78  89  81  98 
(share of production from ruminants)   (0.54)  (0.53)  (0.53)  (0.53)  (0.52)  (0.52) 
Land use (base solution = 100)   100  97  69  88  70  79 
(share of agricultural land that is tilled)  (0.87)  (0.87)  (0.88)  (0.87)  (0.82)  (0.92) 
(kg nitrogen per ha; wheat/grass)  (155/194)   (155/192)   (155/188)   (155/192)   (141/186)   (151/232)  
Measured agricultural support  
 (base solution = 100) 
100  94  75  85  73  98 
Economic welfare (NOK billion)    18.7  21.4  26.5  22.9  26.0  23.1 
Trade liberalization effects  
(Doha ceilings = 100)   
                 
TAMS   202  62  6  25  2  94 
Blue box   211  100  89  99  87  100 
OTDS   195  73  36  51  33  91 
GHG emissions (base solution = 100)  100  99  70  70  70  49 
GHG emissions per hectare (ton CO2 
equiv. per ha in ag. activity)   
(6.02)   (6.16)   (6.10)   (6.02)   (5.96)   (6.46)    16
4.2 Doha solution  
One of the major aims of the on going Doha Development Round is to reduce agricultural 
protection and to impose greater discipline on domestic agricultural subsidies, particularly 
those that are most trade distorting. The latest proposal for support reduction commitments 
was prepared by the previous chair of the WTO agriculture committee, Crawford Falconer 
(WTO,  2008).  As  already  noted,  for  Norway  the  proposal  restricts  support  in  the  main 
categories (TAMS, blue box and OTDS) to roughly one half of recent levels. In addition, 
there  are  separate  commitments  with  respect  to  specific  policy  instruments,  e.g.,  export 
subsidies are to be eliminated and market access improved through reductions in tariffs and 
increases in tariff rate quotas (TRQs).        
  The impact of this proposal on Norwegian agriculture has been analysed by Blandford 
et al. (2010). Column 2 in Table 2 shows the main results, including the implied impact on 
GHG  emissions.  Contrary  to  elevated  expectations  by  the  substantial  cuts  in  the  various 
categories of support, we see that the commitments can be met with only modest impacts on 
agricultural production, land use, and economic support. The reported 4 per cent decrease in 
production and 3 per cent decrease in land use can mainly be explained by the elimination of 
subsidised exports.  Consequently, GHG emissions are virtually unaffected.      
  These small impacts are due to the fact that the proposed Doha disciplines are weak 
with respect to trade distorting support (Orden et al., 2011). As explained in Blandford et al. 
(2010), there are important loopholes that can be exploited to avoid real changes in policies. 
In anticipation of a future agreement, Norway has already adopted or signalled future strategic 
adjustments designed to minimize the impact of a new WTO agreement on its agricultural 
policy.  The  notified  TAMS  and  blue  box  support  have  been  reduced  simply  by  shifting 
support to the green box without major changes in policy. Furthermore, there are generous 
possibilities for defining sensitive products that are exempt from harsh cuts in import barriers.  
Most important, the market price component of the TAMS can be reduced by abolishing 
administered prices for selected products while maintaining real market price support through 
market access restrictions. There is also substantial flexibility for compensating producers 
through deficiency payments within the TAMS ceiling.         
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4.3 Further trade liberalization  
Compared  to  the  Doha  proposal,  more  effective  trade  liberalization  would  be  required  if 
production is to change sufficiently to meet the GHG  emission target.  In this section we 
assume that farmers are confronted by the full effect of the elimination of export subsidies and 
expanded  market  access  commitments  at  current  subsidy  rates.  Import  tariffs  are  reduced 
(proportionally) until the 30 per cent emission target is met. With reference to Figure 2, we 
move along the ray from point 1 and south west to point 2 (no carbon offset) or point 5 in 
Figure 3 (carbon offset), respectively. As the results in column 3 and column 4 in Table 2 
show, the emission target is binding while the Doha trade commitments are met with a safe 
margin.       
Agricultural  activity  is  now  more  seriously  affected.  When  carbon  offsets  are  not 
allowed,  production  and  land  use  decrease  by  22  per  cent  and  31  per  cent,  respectively, 
compared to the current situation. If carbon offsets are allowed, production and land use are 
reduced  by  11 12  per  cent,  i.e.,  agricultural  activity  can  be  kept  at  a  higher  level.  As  a 
consequence of trade liberalization and lower agricultural activity, agricultural support falls 
(by  25 per  cent  in  the  no offset  case),  and  this  contribute  to  increased  economic  welfare 
(NOK 7.8 billion). For a high cost country like Norway, this indicates that GHG abatement 
cost is negative in the  sector if no value is attributed to agricultural activity beyond that 
determined by the world market price of food.  
While  the  intensity  in  production  relevant  to  emissions  was  represented  by  the 
capital/land ratio in the simple analysis in Section 2, the model provides other and more 
specific indicators, such as: (1) the share of production attributed to ruminants (ruminants 
cause  high  emissions  per  unit  of  production);  (2)  the  share  of  land  used  in  agricultural 
production that is regularly tilled (tillage emits carbon); and (3) the use of nitrogen per unit of 
land (emissions increase with the use of fertilizer). An aggregate indicator that incorporates 
these specific indicators is GHG emissions per hectare from agricultural production.  
Based on these indicators, it can be seen that intensity in production is more or less 
unchanged compared to the base solution. The reason is that the abatement strategy used in 
this  simulation  involves  no  major  change  in  relative  prices  for  production  factors,  but  is 
merely based on a cut in producer prices. Consequently, substitution between low and high 
emission activities is more or less ruled out.  
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4.4 Carbon tax 
A  more  targeted policy  to  reduce  GHG  emissions  would  involve  an  explicit  tax  on  such 
emissions or an implicit tax generated by a cap and trade scheme with a binding cap on total 
emissions. These options, in contrast to the trade liberalization scenarios, will affect relative 
factor prices. With the base solution as a point of departure, we introduce a tax of NOK 300 
(roughly €38 at current exchange rates) per ton of GHG emissions (CO2 equivalent). Also, to 
comply with the anticipated Doha agreement, we implement the specific export subsidy and 
market access commitments. Under these conditions, GHG emissions will, according to the 
model simulation, be below the emission ceiling. Consistent with the assumption that the 
authorities have a preference for maintaining a high level of agricultural activity, we scale up 
production proportionally until the emission target becomes binding.  
  Compared to the trade liberalization case, we see that production is higher than in the 
corresponding trade liberalization scenarios. In the no offset case production increases from 
78 to 81 per  cent of the recent level.  The  anticipated substitution towards less emission  
intensive activities also takes place in the no offset case. Mainly as a result of reduced tillage 
and less use of fertilizer, emissions per hectare decrease by roughly 2 per cent. Although the 
effects are modest, the qualitative results conform to the situation set out in Figure 2 in terms 
of a movement from point 2 towards point 3. 
  When carbon offsets can be credited to agriculture’s GHG account, the Doha trade 
agreement becomes binding rather than the GHG target. Aggregate production is maintained 
close to the present level, while emissions are reduced by about 40 per cent. Furthermore, 
factor intensity is reversed in the sense that less land is used per unit of output. With reference 
to Figure 3, this is analogous to a movement from point 5 towards point 6. GHG emissions 
per hectare increase by roughly 7 per cent as the soil is tilled more intensively.    
  An important conclusion derived from these results is that when agricultural land can 
be used for significant carbon sequestration activities (i.e., the offset parameter λ is high) and 
when the resulting carbon offset can be credited to agriculture’s GHG emissions account, 
there may be a strong tendency to intensify agricultural production, even if this leads to higher 
emissions from agricultural production per se.   
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have dealt with strategies for complying with trade liberalization and GHG 
emission cuts from the perspective of a small country whose agriculture is currently protected 
and  whose  political  aim  is  to  keep  agricultural  activity  as  high  as  possible  within  the 
constraints imposed by multilateral agreements.  
We  demonstrate  that  trade  liberalization  implied  by  the  Doha  draft  agreement  on 
agriculture  will  not  have  a  major  impact  on  either  Norwegian  agricultural  production  or 
emissions;  i.e.,  the  proposed  30  per  cent  cut  in  GHG  emissions  will  not  be  achieved. 
Consequently, more effective trade liberalization or carbon taxes are required. While both of 
these measures will reduce agricultural activity (trade liberalization more than carbon taxes), 
economic welfare increases. For a high cost country like Norway, this indicates that GHG 
abatement cost is negative in the sector if no value is attributed to agricultural activity beyond 
that determined by the world market price of food.  
The analysis shows, as a main result, that the impacts on agricultural activity of the 
proposed  emission  cut  depend  substantially  on  whether  credits  are  allowed  for  carbon 
sequestration (carbon offsets) on land taken out of agricultural production. According to the 
model  simulations,  aggregate production  can be  kept  15 20 per  cent  higher  when  carbon 
offsets are credited. Furthermore, while a carbon tax in the no offset case provides incentives 
to substitute towards less emission intensive activities, factor intensity is, in the offset case, 
reversed in the sense that emissions per unit of land increase. The intuition of this result is that 
production  factors  that  increase  land  productivity  (e.g.,  fertilizer  and  tillage)  also  tend  to 
increase  emissions  per  land  unit,  so  that  an  intensification  of  production  (less  land  per 
produced unit) may release land for offset activities. A more general conclusion revealed by 
these results is that when agricultural land can be used for carbon sequestration activities and 
when the resulting carbon offset can be credited to agriculture’s GHG emissions account, 
there may be a strong tendency to intensify agricultural production, even if this leads to higher 
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